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CASENOTES
Standard of Proof in SEC Actions for Injunctive Relief in Securities Fraud
Cases: S.E.C. v. First Financial Group of Texas' — The appropriate standard
of proof in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) civil enforcement ac-
tions for injunctive relief has not often been a point of contention. The
language of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) 2 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) 3 grants to the SEC the right to seek an in-
junction upon a "proper showing" that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
defendant is engaged in or is about to engage in practices that violate the feder-
al securities laws.' Until recently, however, courts have not interpreted this
language in connection with sufficiency of proof.' In 1978, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court of Appeals for the first time articulated a standard of
proof in an action by the SEC to enjoin violations of the federal securities laws.
In SEC v. Savoy Industries, 6 the court held that the appropriate standard of proof
in actions for injunctions against reporting violations, was a preponderance of
the evidence.' The court reasoned that because an injunction was remedial in
' 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1981).
The 1933 Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77bbbb (1976).
The 1934 Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. 55 78a-78kk (1976),
' The SEC is permitted to bring civil enforcement actions for injunctive relief under S
20(b) of the 1933 Act and 5 21(e) of the 1934 Act. Section 20(b), 15 U.S.C. S 77t(b) (1976) pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about
to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of
the provisions of this title, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority
thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United
States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a perma-
nent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
Section 21(e), 15 U.S.C. 5 78u(d) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(e) Upon application of the Commission the district courts of the United States,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and the United
States courts of any territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, injunctions, and orders
commanding (1) any person to comply with the provisions of this title, the rules,
regulations, and orders thereunder, the rules of a national securities exchange or
registered securities association of which such person is a member or person
associated with a member, the rules of a registered clearing agency in which such
person is a participant, the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection
(d) of section 15 of this title....
5 Some courts have discussed the standard of proof required in SEC injunctive actions
in terms of the elements required. See, e.g., SEC v. Aaron, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (scienter
required for certain violations); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 300 F.2d 745, 746 (2d
Cir. 1961) (convincing proof of irreparable injury required), aff 'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963); SEC v.
Waco Fin. Inc., 518 F. Supp. 651, 654 (S.D. Mich. 1981) (showing of irreparable injury not re-
quired).
6 SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (injunction sought for viola-•
tion of reporting provision of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Id. at 1169.
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nature and resulted in a less than severe detriment to the defendant, a higher
burden of proof was not warranted.°
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 1981, became the first court to
establish specifically a standard of proof in actions for injunctive relief against
violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. In SEC v. First
Financial Group of Texas, the court announced that the standard of proof for pre-
liminary injunctive relief in securities fraud cases also was a preponderance of
the evidence.° The defendant'° in First Financial, First Financial Group of
Texas (First Financial), was a dealer" in securities.' 2 It offered and sold to the
public securities with an aggregate value of nine million dollars." These
securities were packages of student loans and repurchase agreements.' 4 Under
the agreements, First Financial was to deposit the securities in safekeeping with
third parties until a specified date when it would repurchase the securities at an
increase in value.' 5
 The defendant, however, did not deposit the securities in
safekeeping and defaulted on the repurchase agreements." After First Finan-
cial defaulted on the repurchase agreements, the SEC brought a civil enforce-
ment action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
alleging violations" of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act," section 10(b) of the 1934
a Id. at 1168-69.
9 645 F.2d at 435.
" Two other defendants, Reynolds and Howton, officers at First Financial, were also
included in the action. Id. at 432. Their appeals from the preliminary injunction prohibiting
them from disposing of their personal assets beyond $1500 per week per individual were dis-
missed as moot by the Court of Appeals because a permanent injunction had already issued. Id.
at 432-33.
" 15 U.S.C. S 78c(a)(5) (1976), a provision of the 1934 Act, provides:
The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying and sell-
ing securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not in-
clude a bank, or any person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own ac-
count, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity, but not as a part of a
regular business.
See also 15 U.S.C. S 78c(a)(4) (1976) (definition of broker).
" 645 F.2d at 431.
15 Id.
" The student loans were made by financial institutions to college students and were
guaranteed by a federal agency. Id. at 431 n.3. The repurchase agreements bound the defendant
to repurchase the student loans from the purchasers at a future date for an amount reflecting a
profit to the purchaser of 11% per annum interest for the period between the purchase of the loan
and its repurchase by the defendant. Id.
" Id. at 431.
16 Id. at 432.
" Id.
" Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q (1976) provides:
SEC. 17, (a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securi-
ties by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
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Act,' 9 and rule 10b-5. 2° The SEC sought to enjoin the defendant from continu-
ing to offer and sell the securities to the public. 21
 In addition, the SEC re-
quested interlocutory relief, including a preliminary injunction and the
appointment of a temporary receiver."
After a hearing," the trial court issued a preliminary injunction which
prohibited First Financial from offering, purchasing or selling the securities in
violation of the securities laws and from disposing of its assets and records."
First Financial appealed the issuance of the injunction, alleging that the district
court erred in failing to require clear and convincing evidence of its violations
of the anti-fraud provisions." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
jected the defendant's arguments and affirmed the district court's order grant-
ing a preliminary injunction." It held that proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence was the appropriate standard for preliminary injunctions in securities
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
19 Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976) provides:
SECTION 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
" 645 F.2d at 432. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1981) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
21
 645 F.2d at 432.
22 Id. The receiver was requested in order to prevent irreparable loss to the investors
and to protect their interests. Id.
" Prior to the hearing, the defendant filed a motion to suppress allegedly illegally ob-
tained evidence furnished by a creditor to the SEC. Id. The district court proceeded with the
hearing on the preliminary injunction, postponing decision on the motion to suppress over the
objections of the defendant. Id.
" Id. Twelve days later a temporary receiver was appointed (five days after a petition
for involuntary bankruptcy had been filed against the defendant). Id.
22 Id. Other errors alleged were: 1) the district court's failure to make specific factual
findings of scienter and a lack of evidence to support such a finding; 2) the district court's refusal
to rule on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence prior to the hearing and decision on the
SEC's motion for preliminary injunction; 3) the district court was without jurisdiction to appoint
a receiver once an involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed. Id. at 435-40. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected these allegations of error and affirmed the district court's
orders. Id.
26 Id. at 434-35, 440.
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fraud actions brought by the SEC."
The First Financial court's decision was based on a balancing of the in-
dividual defendant's interest in avoiding an injunction against the public's in-
terest in effective protection against future harm. 28 The First Financial court
noted that the individual's interest in avoiding an injunction did not outweigh
the "significant public interest in effectively policing the securities industry and
preventing future securities frauds. " 29 Furthermore, the court observed that
the deprivation that the defendant was likely to suffer from an injunction,
namely an inability to commit future violations of the securities laws, was in-
sufficient to justify a departure from the preponderance standard. 3 ° Conse-
quently, it held that the proper standard for SEC civil enforcement actions in
securities fraud cases, "particularly where preliminary injunctive relief is in-
volved," was a preponderance of the evidence standard." This language,
however, leaves unclear whether the court's holding is to be limited to actions
for preliminary injunctions or whether the preponderance standard is to be ap-
plied in all actions for injunctive relief against securities fraud. If the standard
were intended for use in all actions for injunctive relief, the court would have
been merely expressing an opinion that the standard was especially suited to a
preliminary injunction. Under such an interpretation, preliminary injunctions
would be presumed to have a less detrimental impact on the defendant because
of their temporary nature. This casenote will demonstrate that this interpreta-
tion, that the preponderance standard should be applied to all injunctions
against securities fraud, is the one that should be given effect and followed in
future cases.
First Financial is significant because it involves the first challenge to the
traditional assumption that the preponderance standard of proof applies to civil
enforcement actions for injunctive relief for securities fraud." In this first
judicial consideration of the issue, the First Financial court rejected a proposed
increase in the standard of proof." This holding is confirmed by an in-depth
analysis of the competing interests of the defendant and the public in the out-
come of the litigation. In addition, the contrast between common law and
securities fraud and the existence of procedural safeguards prerequisite to the
issuance of a securities injunction lend further support to the court's conclu-
sion. By enunciating the applicability of a preponderance standard to securities
fraud injunctions, for the first time, First Financial has begun to resolve uncer-
" Id. at 435.
28 Id. at 434.
29 Id. at 435.
" Id. The temporary, tentative nature of a preliminary injunction was a factor in the
court's decision. Id. at 435 n.8.
" Id. at 435.
32 Until recently, courts had assumed that the usual standard for civil actions, the pre-
ponderance standard, was appropriate for securities injunctions and thus had not discussed the
burden of proof in terms of the sufficiency of evidence. The courts had, however, addressed the
issue of certain other elements of the standard of proof. See cases cited supra at note 5.
" 645 F.2d at 434-35.
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tainty about the appropriate standard of proof in such actions. First Financial
thus has led the way for other federal courts to establish as a uniform burden of
proof for all civil enforcement actions for injunctions against securities fraud,
the standard of a preponderance of the evidence.
This casenote will first outline the balancing of interests test used by courts to
determine applicable standards of proof. In connection with the balancing test,
the uses and functions of the three most commonly used standards of proof will
be reviewed. This review will suggest that an equal allocation of the risk of er-
roneous decision through a preponderance standard in the securities fraud area
is in keeping with a broad principle behind the determination of appropriate
standards of proof in other substantive areas of law. This broad principle is the
policy preference for shifting the risk of erroneous decision, through an in-
crease in the standard of proof, away from the defendants as their interests gain
in importance. Next, a general description of the SEC civil enforcement action
for injunctive relief and its standard of proof will be outlined. In this context,
the First Financial court's decision will be discussed. It will be argued that the
preponderance standard is the appropriate standard of proof for all injunctions
sought by the SEC for violations of federal securities anti-fraud statutes. Then,
the interests of defendants will be described in detail. These interests are shown
to arise from the direct and indirect consequences of an injunction. The
public's interest in protection against securities fraud also will be outlined.
Next, this casenote will discuss two additional factors important in the deter-
mination of an appropriate standard of proof for SEC suits for anti-fraud in-
junctions. These two factors involve a comparison of securities fraud and com-
mon law fraud and an examination of the contrast between SEC injunctions
and traditional equity injunctions. An analysis of the competing interests of in-
dividual defendants and the investing public as well as these two influential fac-
tors will suggest that the public's interests should outweigh the individual's.
Based upon this analysis and critique, it will be submitted that the holding in
First Financial, that the preponderance standard is appropriate for preliminary
injunctions, should be extended to include all injunctive relief requested by the
SEC for violations of the anti-fraud provisions. An equal allocation of the risk
of an erroneous decision would best balance the competing interests of the in-
vesting public and the individual defendant.
I. STANDARDS OF PROOF
A general examination of available standards of proof provides a useful
background for determining which of the existing standards of proof is the most
appropriate for SEC injunctive actions. First, the balancing of interests test for
determining an appropriate standard of proof will be outlined. Then, the three
most common standards, the preponderance standard, the standard of clear
and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt will be de-
scribed. The allocation of the risk of erroneous decision and the importance of
the defendant's interests will be identified for each of the three standards.
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In Addington v. Texas," the United States Supreme Court commented that
the standard of proof applied in a particular case "serves to allocate the risk of
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to
the ultimate decision." 35
 Traditionally, in the absence of Congressional
prescription, 36
 the appropriate degree of proof required is a matter for judicial
determination." The Addington case involved the appropriate standard of proof
for involuntary commitment in a civil case. 36
 To determine the correct burden
of proof for the state, the court devised a balancing test. Under this test, the in-
dividual's interest in not being involuntarily confined was weighed against the
state's interest in committing the emotionally disturbed." Although the Ad-
dington court specifically addressed the issue of what standard of proof was to be
applied in a civil commitment hearing, the same balancing of public interests
against the interests of the defendant has been applied in the securities area. 4°
In the securities cases, the balance was between the public interest in protection
against securities fraud and the individual's interest in avoiding the particular
sanction sought by the SEC.'"
The courts have employed three basic standards of proof in civil and
criminal proceedings.'" The selection of the standard has, in each type of case,
related to the outcome of a determination test such as the balancing of interests
test. Generally, when the interests of the defendant have outweighed the
34
 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
35 Id. at 423. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stated: "[i]ri the realm of fact-
finding, the standard of proof acts to instruct the fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of
adjudication." Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring)).
36 Absent constitutional concerns, the courts are bound to a standard of proof if it is dic-
tated by Congress. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 95 (1981).
" Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1976).
" Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
39 Id.
4° See cases cited infra at note 41. The proper allocation of risk of error is particularly
suited to a comparison of interests. As the balance shifts toward the individual, the allocation of
risk may be shifted away. Such a sliding scale type of test seems more appropriate than a one-step
determination of whether an interest meets a certain threshold level of importance because of the
broad category of interests involved both on the public side as well as the individual's side.
" See, e.g., SEC v. First Fin., 645 F.2d 429, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1981) (balancing test ap-
plied in securities injunction action); Decker v. SEC, 631 F.2d 1380, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980)
(balancing test applied in administrative proceeding). In cases where no personal hardship is in-
volved, the standard can be established by the likelihood of the truth of the general type of claim.
See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co„ 467 F. Supp. 1142, 1173-74 n.159 (S.D.
Ohio 1979). The identity of the litigants is not relevant in such cases. Id. See Case Comment,
Scope of Review or Standard of Proof — Judicial Control of SEC Sanctions: Steadman v. SEC, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1845, 1852 n.66 (1980).
42
 There is some question as to the difference in the practical effect of the three different
standards. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424-25 (1979). The courts, however, have held
that "adopting a 'standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise.' " Id. at 425
(quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. dismissed sub nom., Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355
(1972)).
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public's interest, the standard of proof chosen has been more restrictive than
the preponderance standard. The least restrictive standard is the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard, used in most civil proceedings involving private
disputes for damages." When the preponderance standard is applied, the trier
of fact must believe that it is more probable than not that the facts presented by
the plaintiff are true or exist." The preponderance standard allocates equally
between the litigants the risk of an erroneous decision and indicates the
'minimal societal interest in the outcome of such disputes between private in-
dividuals. 45
 The standard also may be applied when the action involves a
regulatory agency acting in the public interest."
An intermediate standard is the standard of clear and convincing
evidence. 47
 Under this standard, the trier of fact must believe that it is highly
probable that the facts presented by the moving party are true. 48 Although it is
"no stranger to the civil law," the intermediate standard is used less fre-
quently than the other evidentiary standards of a preponderance of the evi-
dence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 5° It has been employed primarily
in civil fraud cases." Applying a higher standard of proof than is normally used
45 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (Chadbourn rev. 1981) S 2493 n.1.
44 McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 261 (1944).
45
 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
46
 When a strong public interest, promoted by a regulatory agency such as the SEC, is
balanced against a lesser individual interest (see infra notes 152-67 and accompanying text), use of
the preponderance standard appears justified. See generally McBaine, supra note 44, at 242
(discussing shifts in the allocation of risk as a function of the importance of the defendant's inter-
ests). Although an allocation of the risk of erroneous decision may be shifted away from the
defendant, it is never shifted toward him, regardless of the importance of the competing interest.
At most, the standard of proof will mandate an equal allocation of the risk. Id. Moreover, the
preponderance standard has traditionally been employed because most administrative proceed-
ings have been regarded as civil and remedial in nature. WIGMORE, supra note 43, at 5 2498. The
preponderance standard was first adopted by the SEC for use in administrative proceedings in In
re White, 3 S.E.C. 466 (1938). In that case, the SEC held that proceedings for a suspension or ex-
pulsion were "closely analogous to proceedings for the collection of a statutory penalty" and thus
were of a civil rather than a criminal nature. Id. at 539-40. Consequently, issues of fact were to be
proven "according to a reasonable preponderance of the evidence." Id.
" This standard appears under different combinations of terms, usually including
some or all of the following: clear, convincing, cogent, unequivocal. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 5
340(b) (2d ed. 1972). Although courts have not agreed on the precise position this standard oc-
cupies in the continuum of standards, it generally refers to a standard greater than a preponder-
ance but not so great as beyond a reasonable doubt. See McBaine, supra note 44, at 251-54. Some
courts have tried to push this intermediate position closer to one of the polar positions by adding
or deleting one of the above terms. See, e.g. , Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence is a higher burden than clear and con-
vincing evidence).
McBaine, supra note 44, at 262-63.
Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
5° Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
E.g., American Cyanamid Co. v. Electrical Indus., Inc., 630 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th
Cir. 1980) (clear and convincing evidence standard); Norton Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530
F.2d 435, 444 (1st Cir. 1976) (clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence); Goodman v.
Poland, 395 F. Supp. 660, 686 n.17 (D. Md. 1975) (clear and convincing evidence); Allensworth
v. Ben Franklin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 71 111. App. 3d 1041, 1044, 389 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1979)
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for civil actions to such cases has been justified on the basis of the quasi-
criminal nature of a fraud action and the typical reliance in such cases on cir-
cumstantial evidence. 52 In addition, the courts have recognized that allegations
of fraud "might seriously damage [one's] standing and associations in [the]
community."'" As a result, the clear and convincing standard of proof has
been imposed in deference to the "adverse social consequences to the in-
dividual of . . . a fraud conviction." 54 Thus, in civil fraud cases, the in-
dividual defendant's interests are significant enough to require a shift in the
allocation of the risk of erroneous decision to the plaintiff. 55
The most rigorous standard is that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 56
This standard is applied primarily in criminal proceedings." Under this stand-
ard, the prosecution bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact to believe
to a point of almost certainty, or beyond a reasonable doubt, the truth of all
facts essential to the crime." The interests of the criminal defendant in life and
liberty are considered of such importance that they have been constitutionally
protected by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion." Thus, the balance of interests in criminal cases has been weighted heavi-
ly in favor of the individual's interest in retaining his life and liberty." As a
(clear and convincing evidence). But see Jensen v. Sohler, 601 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir. 1979) (pre-
ponderance of the evidence); Blaeser Development Corp. v. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n,
375 So. 2d 1118, 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (preponderance standard).
52 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979). The Court noted that
[o]ne typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or
some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in
those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some
jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his reputation
tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof.
Id. at 423-24.
The first use of the clear and convincing standard of proof was in English equity cases in-
volving parol evidence. The court's concern over the quality of evidence led it to develop a
burden of proof higher than the traditional preponderance standard. See, e.g. , Townshend (The
Marquis) v. Stangroom, 31 Eng. Rep. 1076 (Ch. 1801); Henkle v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co.,
27 Eng. Rep. 1055 (Ch. 1749). The need to rely on circumstantial evidence in common law fraud
cases also has been proposed as a justification for employing the clear and convincing standard in
such cases. See, e.g. , Smith v. Rhode Island Co., 39 R.I. 146, 154, 98 A. 1, 4 (1916). Use of cir-
cumstantial evidence alone usually is, however, insufficient cause to resort to a higher standard
of proof. See, e.g. , General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Edwards, 181 Okla. 288, 290, 73 P.2d 1145, 1147
(1937); Roedinger v. Union Pacific R. Co., 95 Kan. 146, 151, 147 P. 837, 839 (1915).
53 McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)).
59 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
55 Id. at 424.
56 McBaine, supra note 44, at 255.
WIGMORE, supra note 43, at S 2497. The standard has been applied in a few non-
criminal proceedings, particularly in illegitimacy cases. McBaine, supra note 44, at 255 n.25; see
also WIGMORE, supra note 43, at S 2498 for citations of civil actions where this standard has been
applied.
'a McBaine, supra note 44, at 265.
59 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
6° See id.
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result, the standard of proof has been designed to eliminate almost all likeli-
hood of erroneous conviction. 6 ' The standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt allocates the risk of an erroneous decision almost entirely to the prose-
cuting state. 62
In summary, a standard of proof serves to allocate between the litigants
the risk of an erroneous decision. It varies along a continuum ranging from the
least restrictive, preponderance of the evidence, standard to the most restric-
tive, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, standard in accordance with the in-
dividual and public interests involved. As the individual defendant's interest
gains in importance or the public's or plaintiff's interest declines, the court
may shift the allocation of the risk of erroneous decision away from the defend-
ant and increase the degree of proof required. At common law, the standard in
civil fraud cases is firmly established as clear and convincing evidence. The
standard for such actions when brought by the SEC for violations of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws, however, is less certain. In this area,
due to a lack of a congressionally mandated standard of proof (other than "a
proper showing" 63) the judiciary has been left to determine the appropriate
standard of proof. The Addington balancing test has been applied by federal
courts in the securities area" and seems particularly well-suited to securities
actions. The flexibility of this balancing test fits in well with the range of in-
terests that a particular defendant may have and which are in competition with
the public interest in protection against securities fraud. Applying the Addington
test to SEC actions for injunctive relief demonstrates that the equal allocation
of the risk of erroneous decision found in the preponderance standard is the
most appropriate burden for the SEC to bear.
II. A PREPONDERANCE STANDARD FOR SEC ACTIONS
FOR -INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The 1933 and 1934 Acts provide the SEC with the option to seek injunc-
tive relief in a civil enforcement action. 65 Under the statutory language, the
SEC must make a "proper showing" that there is a reasonable likelihood that
the defendant is engaged in or is about to engage in practices that violate the
federal securities laws. 66 Until recently, however, courts had not addressed the
61 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979).
62 Id.
65 See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
64 See cases cited supra note 41.
65 Section 21(e), 15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (1976). Relief under section 21(e) is, in fact, the
only civil non-administrative remedy available to the SEC. For the text of this provision, see supra
note 4.
66 Aaron v, SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 699 (1980); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION,
1975,1976-81 (2d ed. 1961). Some courts, in addressing the issue of the likelihood of future viola-
tions, do not require proof of a past violation. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.
629, 633 (1953). But see SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir.
1972) (question is whether in light of past violations, there is a reasonable likelihood of repetition
of the wrong).
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issue of the appropriate burden of proof in terms of what a "proper showing"
must be in SEC actions for injunctive relief. 67 In fact, most courts still have not
yet decided this question." The first court to address this issue was the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in SEC v. Savoy Industries." In Savoy, the
SEC sought an injunction against an individual for violations of the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act." The court declared that the appropriate stand-
ard of proof in such actions was proof by a preponderance of the evidence."
The defendant's proposal that the proper standard was a clear and convincing
evidence standard" was considered and rejected by the Savoy court." In
reaching that decision, the court briefly examined the factors that had led to the
employment of the clear and convincing standard in SEC administrative pro-
ceedings for fraud:74 According to the court, these factors included the quasi-
criminal nature of the case and a deprivation of livelihood likely to result from
the proposed sanctions." The court noted, however, that injunctive relief suits
were "qualitatively different" from such administrative proceedings." This
qualitative difference arose from the quasi-penal effects of administrative pro-
ceedings as compared with the solely remedial and preventative nature of in-
junctions." Furthermore, the court found that an injunction against future
violations of the reporting provisions was not likely to involve a deprivation of
livelihood to the defendant." As a result, the court concluded that a less strict,
preponderance standard was the appropriate standard of proof."
07 See supra note 5.
66
 Only two cases have involved the issue of the standard of proof for SEC injunctions
to date. SEC v. First Fin., 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1981) (standard of proof for SEC injunctions
against fraud); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (standard of proof for SEC
injunctions against reporting violations).
69 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
70 Id. at 1168 n.46. These violations were of $5 13(d)(1, 3) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. $
78m(d)(l, 3) (1976), which require the filing of certain statements with the SEC.
" 587 F.2d at 1169.
72
 This standard was first proposed for use in SEC administrative proceedings in Col-
lins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Collins case involved severe
sanctions imposed by the SEC in an administrative proceeding against a registered broker-dealer
for violations of various anti-fraud provisions. Id. at 821 n.2. The court ruled that the severe
detriment to the defendant imposed by the sanctions (amounting to a deprivation of livelihood)
and the circumstantial nature of the proof offered by the SEC warranted a standard of proof
greater than a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 826. Collins was essentially overturned by the
United States Supreme Court in Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981). In Steadman, the Court
held that $ 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 5 556(d) (1976), prescribed a pre-
ponderance standard for SEC administrative proceedings. 450 U.S. at 102.
" 587 F.2d at 1168-69.
74 Id .
72 See Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
" 587 F.2d at 1168.
" Id. For a discussion of how an injunction, while remedial in nature, may have severe
collateral consequences, see infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
76 587 F.2d at 1169.
79 Id.
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In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. First Financial
Group of Texas" extended the Savoy holding and ruled that the preponderance
standard of proof should be employed in SEC civil enforcement actions re-
questing preliminary injunctive relief for violations of the anti-fraud provi-
sions." The First Financial court's decision was based generally on the Savoy line
of reasoning. First, the court applied the balancing of interests test developed
in Addington" to determine the allocation of the risk of error." Then, the court
summarily concluded that the defendant's interest in "avoiding the imposition
of preliminary injunctive relief '84
 did not outweigh the "public interest in ef-
fective protection against future harm to the public from a defendant's
fraudulent investment schemes." 85 Finally, the court reviewed the reasoning of
the Savoy court concerning the severity of deprivation that the defendant was
likely to suffer. 86 Agreeing with the reasoning of Savoy, the court held that First
Financial's deprivation, the proscription on future securities violations, and its
interest in avoiding such a proscription, were outweighed by the "significant
public interest in effectively policing the securities industry and preventing
future securities frauds shown to be reasonably likely."' According to the
court, such a shift of the balance necessitated adherence to the preponderance
of the evidence standard, particularly where preliminary injunctive relief, tem-
porary by nature, was involved. 88
The First Financial court's analysis of the interests involved in the balanc-
ing test appears superficial. The court failed adequately to consider that an in-
junction might have effects beyond a proscription on the future commission of
securities laws violations. Furthermore, the court did not comment on what
made the public's interest in protection against future securities frauds so
significant. In spite of the First Financial court's limited examination of the in-
terests involved, the analysis and critique that follows will demonstrate that the
court readied the correct conclusion. The appropriate standard of proof in
SEC civil enforcement actions for injunctive relief in securities fraud cases
should be a preponderance of the evidence.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BALANCING TEST
It is unclear from the wording of the First Financial holding whether the
Fifth Circuit intended the preponderance standard to apply only in SEC suits
for preliminary injunctive relief." It is now submitted, however, that the
" 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1981).
8 ' M. at 435.
" 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
83 645 F.2d at 434-35.
64 Id. at 434.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 435.
" Id.
as Id.
89 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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reasoning of First Financial is fully applicable to both permanent and temporary
injunctions sought by the SEC. An analysis of the competing interests of the in-
dividual defendant and the investing public demonstrates that a preponderance
standard appropriately allocates the risk of an erroneous decision in all SEC
civil enforcement actions for injunctive relief. First, the defendant's interests in
a securities fraud injunction suit will be outlined. In this connection, particular
attention to the distinction between the direct and indirect results of an injunc-
tion is warranted. Next, the casenote will discuss the interest of the public in
obtaining injunctions against securities fraud. In addition to the competing in-
terests of the public and the defendant in a securities action, two other factors
important to the balancing process are discussed. The first of these factors, in-
volving the use of the clear and convincing standard in common law fraud ac-
tions, is enunciated within the context of the distinctions between securities
fraud and common law fraud. The second factor considered involves a com-
parison between traditional equity injunctions and SEC injunctions. After
describing the interests and factors involved, the interests of defendants in
avoiding injunctions will be balanced against the public's interest in the en-
forcement of securities regulations. Finally, the outcome of this balancing will
demonstrate the appropriateness of the preponderance standard for all SEC
civil enforcement actions for injunctive relief.
On first impression, the individual's interest in avoiding the imposition of
an injunction seems more substantial than was acknowledged in First
Financia1. 90 While it is well-established that the primary purpose of injunctive
relief is "to deter future violations" and not to punish the violator," 92 the con-
sequences of injunctions may be as severe as those of more punitive
measures." These consequences of an injunction may be direct or collateral.
The direct result of an SEC injunction is a court order prohibiting violation of
the federal securities laws in the future." Failure to comply with this order can
result in prosecution for criminal or civil contempt." This contempt sanction
90 As noted in the text supra at note 30, the First Financial court stated that the only
deprivation to the defendant would be an inability to commit future securities violations. 645
F.2d at 435.
92 See, e.g., Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). In Lipper, Judge Friendly stated: "the objective [of injunctive pro-
ceedings] . . is solely to prevent threatened future harm .... "
92 SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The Collins court
recognized that whereas actions by the SEC may be viewed as remedial by the public and the
enforcement agency, they may be viewed as having punitive impact by the sanctioned individual.
Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
93 In light of the serious detriment an injunction may impose, a defendant's interest in
avoiding the injunction may be substantial. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Soc., Inc., 574
F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978) ("An injunction while not always 'a drastic remedy' . . often is
much more than [a] 'mild prophylactic' . . .").
94 See Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope of Judicial Discretion, 10 CO-
LUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 328, 340 (1974).
95 Id. at 340-41; see Mathews, Criminal Prosecutions Under the Federal Securities Laws and
Related Statutes: The Nature and Development of SEC Criminal Cases, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901,
946-50 (1971).
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may issue even where there. has been no "intent" to violate the securities
laws. 96
 These penalties, moreover, may be incurred without the benefit of an
indictment or a jury tria1: 97
In addition to the direct consequences of an injunction, there are collateral
or indirect results. Some of these indirect consequences may follow an injunc-
tion whenever the SEC decides that such sanctions are within the best interests
of the public. Some sanctions result from an independent proceeding con-
ducted by the SEC after the issuance of an injunction. Other consequences
follow the imposition of an injunction automatically by operation of law. For
example, a Regulation A exemption from registration requirements for the is-
suance of securities is automatically unavailable to an enjoined party." In ad-
dition, an injunction prevents the enjoined party from serving as a director, of-
ficer or employee of a registered investment company. 99 Most of the collateral
consequences of an injunction, however, do not automatically issue. Based
upon the imposition of an injunction, the SEC may, after notice and a hearing,
impose other sanctions. An injunction may serve as the basis for suspension or
revocation of a broker-dealer's registration or for prohibition of association
with broker-dealers.'" The SEC also can bar a permanently enjoined party
from practice before the SEC . 161
A further consequence of the issuance of an injunction is the adverse
publicity that may accompany a fraud injunction. The SEC often requires that
an injunction be disclosed in reports and information sent to shareholders and
investors as well as in materials filed with regulatory agencies such as the
96 See United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 247 F. Supp. 481, 490 (D. Md.
1965). In the Custer Channel Wing case, the court noted that proof of specific intent was not an
essential element of criminal contempt. Id. Furthermore, although the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that proof of scienter or intent was necessary to show certain securities fraud vio-
lations, it was not required for all violations. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980)
(scienter not required for violations of sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act). Therefore,
a negligent violation of such provisions would qualify as contempt. See Note, supra note 94, at
343.
97
 SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 198 (N.D. III, 1977) (quoting 3A H. BLOOM-
ENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORP. LAW 802[3j, at 8-12 (1976)). See, e.g., Gunn v.
Univ. Committee to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970) (injunction en-
forceable by power of contempt).
99
 SEC Rule 252(c)(4) of Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. 230.252(c)(4) (1981). Regulation A
exempts certain small public offerings of securities from registration.
99 See s 9(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-9-(a)(2)
(1976).
See 5 15(b)(4)(C) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(4)(c) (1976).
101 SEC's Rules of Practice, Rule 2(e)(3)(i), 17 C.F.R. 5 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1981). A bar
from practice before the SEC means that one may not advise, counsel, or otherwise practice
securities law in general. The application of this rule, particularly in relation to attorneys, has
been the subject of debate. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 578-82 (2d Cir. 1979);
see generally Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 774
(1979) (criticizing recent expansions in the use of Rule 2(e)); Greenbaum, Client's Frauds and Their
Lawyers' Obligations, 68 GEO. L. J. 191 (1979) (discussing the duly imposed upon lawyers by the
SEC's use of Rule 2(e)).
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SEC.'" The institution of a suit and the final outcome are also publicly
reported. 10' Moreover, the SEC may publicize any disciplinary proceedings it
conducts or may even publish investigation reports regardless of whether the
reports lead to criminal, civil or disciplinary actions by the agency. 1 °4 These
public disclosures may be particularly damaging when the connotations of
dishonesty and disgrace accompanying violations of the securities anti-fraud
provisions are considered.'" In fact, many practitioners look upon the reputa-
tional damages resulting from an injunction as devastating to their position in
the securities industry. 106
 As a result of these consequences, it has been sug-
gested that "a successful injunctive action . . may deprive an individual of
his livelihood.'" 07
Although the collateral consequences may, indeed, have a detrimental im-
pact on the defendant, some of these consequences are the results of inde-
pendent proceedings that carry their own standards of proof.'" As noted
above, the suspension and/or revocation of a broker-dealer's registration oc-
curs only after an administrative proceeding.'" At such a proceeding, the SEC
still must show the need for such a sanction by a preponderance of the
evidence."° To bar an enjoined party from practice before the SEC also re-
quires a separate hearing at which the SEC must show that the public interest
requires such disqualification."' Thus, it seems inappropriate to consider the
individual's interest in avoiding an injunction as equivalent to his interests in
avoiding such independent sanctions." 2 Furthermore, upon application and
101 See SEC Rel. Nos. 33-5949, 34-15006, 35-20643, 1C-10342 (Sept. 30, 1978), 15 SEC
Docket 428 (Aug. 15, 1978); Mathews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 REV. SEC. REG. 969, 971
(1972).
103 Mathews, supra note 102, at 976.
104 See Note, The Burden of Proof in SEC Disciplinary Proceedings: Preponderance and Beyond, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 642, 652-53 nn.52-54 (1981).
1 °' See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robbins, 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979) (court noted harm
to defendant's good will arising from charge of fraud); Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676, 680-81
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (court noted seriousness of potential anti-fraud sanction and consequent injury
to reputation); Gilbert v. Bagley, 492 F. Supp. 714, 725 (M.D.N.C. 1980) (court noted reputa-
tional damage that may result from fraud allegations); Rich v. -Touche Ross & Co., 68 F:R.D.
243, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court noted that reputational damage from fraud allegations particu-
larly acute in certain professions).
100 See Note, supra note 104, at 452 n.52. 	 •
107 Berner and Franklin, Scienter and SEC Rule 10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in
Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 786 (1976).
108 SEC v. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682, 701 n.43 (D.D.C. 1978).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
"° See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (preponderance standard required in
SEC disciplinary proceedings).
"I Note, supra note 94, at 342.
"2 In National Student Mktg., supra note 108, a case involving an injunction against an at-
torney for aiding and abetting violations of the securities laws, the court distinguished the conse-
quences of an injunction from the deprivations resulting from subsequent independent actions.
457 F. Supp. at 701 n.43.
September 1982]	 CASENOTES
	 1543
after a hearing before the SEC, the automatic results of an injunction, namely
the disqualification of the enjoined party from serving as a director, officer or
employee of a registered investment company or from receiving a Regulation A
exemption, may be waived or lifted."' Thus, the unavoidable consequences to
the individual defendant constitute his interest in avoiding an injunction.
These consequences are an inability to commit future violations of the federal
securities laws without risking a contempt charge if such violations occur, and
any reputational damages arising from adverse publicity.
Balanced against the interest of the individual in avoiding an injunction is
the public interest in protecting investors against fraudulent securities
schemes.'" This public interest in protection was the aftermath of the
disastrous 1929 stock market crash."' In 1933 and 1934, Congress recognized
that the old doctrine of caveat emptor was inapplicable to the securities in-
dustry due to the inherently unequal position of the investing public in com-
parison with that of the securities dealer." 6 As a result, Congress incorporated
into the 1933 and 1934 Acts a policy of full disclosure."' In recognition that the
crash was due in large part to widespread abuses and the abandonment of fair
dealing by securities dealers,"° Congress also wanted to protect the investing
" 3 This waiver or lifting is made pursuant to Rule 252(f) under Regulation A, 17
C.F.R. 230.252 (1973) and 5 9(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. S 80a-9(c)
(1970). See Mathews, supra note 102, at 970 nn.12-14; see, e.g., SEC v. Sun Oil Ins. [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (SEC granted temporary
waiver of disqualification).
" 4 645 F.2d at 434.
"5 The 1934 Senate Committee Report on Banking and Currency (the Pecora Commit-
tee Report) commented on the stock market collapse as follows:
The economic cost of this down-swing in security values cannot be accurately
gauged. The wholesale closing of banks and other financial institutions; the loss of
deposits and savings; the drastic curtailment of credit; the inability of debtors to
meet their obligations; the growth of unemployment; the diminution of the pur-
chasing power of the people to the point where industry and commerce were pros-
trated; and the increase in bankruptcy, poverty, and distress — all these condi-
tions must be considered in some measure when the ultimate cost to the American
public of speculating on the securities exchanges is computed.
Columbia Note, supra note 95 at 332 (quoting Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
Stock Exchange Practices, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)).
16 Newton, The Limits of Liability: Recent Judicial Restrictions on Rule 10b-5, 6 FLA. ST .
U.L. REV. 63, 65 (1978).
" 7 Id.
A description of the abuses leading to the crash appears in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933):
During the post war decade some 50 billion of new securities were floated in the
United States. Fully half or 25 billion worth of securities floated during this period
have been proven to be worthless. These cold figures spell tragedy in the lives of
thousands of individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated after years of
effort, in these worthless securities. The flotation of such a mass of essentially
fraudulent securities was made possible because of the complete abandonment by
many underwriters and dealers in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and
prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement in investment in any
enterprise. Alluring promises of easy wealth were freely made with little or no at-
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public by providing for the enforcement of a high standard of business ethics." 9
It therefore provided specific bans on misleading, fraudulent and deceptive
practices"° and enacted enforcement provisions under the 1933 and 1934
Acts."' The SEC was then created to enforce the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 22 The
SEC's most frequently employed scheme of enforcement is through civil en-
forcement actions for injunctive relief.'" In addition to congressional recogni-
tion of this public interest, courts also have noted its importance. Weighing the
desire of Congress to protect public investors 1 " as well as the basic need for
such protection, courts generally have found that protection of the investing
public is a significant interest.'" Some courts have gone further and held that
because injunctions are designed to protect against future violations and
because the necessity of such protection is significant, due to the harm that may
result from such violations, the public interest usually takes precedence over
the individual's interest.' 26
tempt to bring to the investors' attention those facts essential to estimating the
worth of any security.
Newton, supra note 116, at 64 n.6 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933))
19 Newton, supra note 116, at 65.
120 The 1933 and 1934 Acts contain three general anti-fraud provisions designed to pro-
tect the investing public: 17(a) of the 1933 Act (see supra note 18 for the text of this provision);
10(b) of the 1934 Act (see supra note 19 for the text of this provision) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder (see supra note 20 for the text of this rule); 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act. Section 15(c)(1),
15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(1) provides:
(c)(1) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to induce or at-
tempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security (other than commercial
paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial bills) otherwise than on a national
securities exchange of which it is a member by means of any manipulative, decep-
tive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance, and no municipal securities dealer
shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
to effect any transaction in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale
of, any municipal security by means of any manipulative, deceptive, or other
fraudulent device or contrivance. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this
paragraph, by rules and regulations define such devices or contrivances as are
manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent.
121 See, e.g., sections 15(b)(4), (6) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. $s 78o(b)(4), (6) (1976)
(provisions for administrative disciplinary proceedings); 1933 and 1934 Act sections cited supra at
note 4.
122 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 181, 186 (1963).
123
 In 1980, the SEC instituted 74 administrative proceedings, 103 injunctive actions
and referred 74 cases to the Justice Department for criminal proceedings. 46 SEC Ann. Rep.
141-42 (1980).
124 Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1960).
125 Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 450
U.S. 91 (1981). The Steadman court noted: "[t]he public interest in high standards of conduct in
the securities business is a great one." Id. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458
F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959).
125 See, e.g., SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 53 (7th Cir. 1972);
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Culpepper,
270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959). But cf. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L. J. 1227,
1234-35, 1238-40 (1966) (discussing the inadequacy of the "public interest" standard); Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1712 (1975) (there is no
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In balancing the individual and public interests at stake, two other factors
may be considered in the determination of the appropriate standard of proof for
SEC injunctions. First, it may be argued that because a clear and convincing
standard is employed in common law fraud cases,'" the same standard should
be used for securities fraud. Such a proposition fails to consider that securities
fraud is a different type of action than common law fraud. Securities fraud was
designed to encompass a broader range of conduct than the conduct actionable
under common law for civil fraud. 128 Furthermore, at the time of the enact-
ment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, there were two types of remedies for
misrepresentation or fraud under the common law. Actions for equitable relief
had a lower burden of proof than action for damages. 129 This lower burden was
due to the different nature of the remedies. Equitable relief, particularly
injunctive relief, serves basically to prevent future violations rather than to
punish the violator.' 30 In contrast, the legal remedies for common law fraud
"center about redress, vindication, punishment, [and] restitution.'" 3 ' Thus, a
civil fraud action for damages may subject an individual defendant to a poten-
tially greater liability than is usually found in an equitable action.'" Under the
federal securities laws, Congress created only an equitable action for enforce-
ment of the anti-fraud provisions.'" Although the courts may order ancillary
definable public interest but only competing individual and group interests). The court in SEC v.
Decker stated: "personal injury 'is not of controlling importance as primary consideration must be
given to the statutory intent to protect investors.' " 631 F.2d 1380, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980)
(quoting Associated Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1960)).
127 See SUM note 51 for civil fraud cases using clear and convincing standard.
128 Common law fraud is generally distinguished from securities fraud. Stevens v. Ab-
bott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 847 (E. D. Va. 1968) (churning is fraud in law, different
from common law fraud); Loss, supra note 66, at 1435. Although the exact reason for this distinc-
tion is unknown, it is possibly due to a recognition by Congress that common law fraud was an
insufficient deterrent to abuse in the securities area as illustrated by the 1929 stock market crash.
As a result of the crash, Congress did establish the broader concept of securities fraud in the 1933
and 1934 Acts. Newton, supra note 116, at 64. This broader concept apparently was designed to
be flexible enough to protect the investing public from "a certain class of gentleman [who] . .
would lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy way of evading the
law." LOSs, supra note 66, at 1436 (quoting State v. Whiteaker, 118 Or. 656, 661, 247 P. 1077,
1079 (1926)). As the result of this concern, securities fraud includes by definition conduct that
would not be actionable at common law. For example, the SEC may enjoin a party who is
"about to engage" in violations of the securities regulations. See section 20(b) of the 1933 Act
cited supra at note 4. In addition, intent is not required for certain types of securities fraud. See
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
Casenote, A &leiter Requirement for SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b)— Investor Protec-
tion Under the Securities Laws is Further Restricted: Aaron v. SEC, 22 B.C.L. REV. 595, 618 (1981).
"° Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
151 F. LAWRENCE, SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1929).
"7 Schulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227, 233 (1933).
i" Section 21(e) of the 1934 Act. See supra note 4 for the text of this provision. Although
no private right of action for securities fraud was explicitly created by Congress in the securities
laws, such a right has been recognized by courts as implied under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
See Supt. of Ins. v, Bankers L. & C. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). These private actions may be
brought to obtain damages as well as equitable relief. See, e.g. , Harris v. American Investment
Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1975) (out-of-pocket damages awarded to private litigant);
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relief' 34
 under general equitable principles in addition to or in lieu of injunctive
relief, this relief also is remedial rather than punitive.'" Ancillary relief has in-
cluded orders for disgorgement or return or profits, appointment of a receiver
to protect and preserve assets, appointment of independent members to the
board of directors and appointment of a special counse1. 136
 The purpose of such
ancillary relief is to restore the injured party to the state he was in prior to the
violation and to prevent the occurrence of additional harm.'"
The second factor which may be influential in the determination of the ap-
propriate standard of proof in SEC injunctive suits involves a comparison of
traditional equity injunctions and SEC injunctions. SEC actions for injunctive
relief differ from traditional actions for injunctive relief in that the SEC need
not show all of the elements usually required to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion.'" In traditional actions, these elements include a showing that the plain-
tiff has no adequate remedy at law,' 39
 that he will be irreparably harmed if the
injunction does not issue,'" that the harm to the defendant imposed by the in-
junction is less than the harm the plaintiff would suffer without the injunction
(the balance of hardships), 141
 that granting the injunction is not against public
interest,' 42
 and that the plaintiff is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits. 143
The courts, however, have decided that the SEC need not show all of these
elements. A showing by the SEC of irreparable harm to an individual or
market is not required by most courts.'" The SEC need not show a favorable
Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1974) (rescission ordered); Ruckle v. Roto
American Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1964) (preliminary injunction permitted). See also
Loss, supra note 66, at 1795-96; Note, Measure of Damages in Rule 106-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974).
1 " Ancillary relief is equitable relief other than injunctive relief. See SEC v. Pennsyl-
vania Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593, 598-99 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see generally Jacobs, judicial and Ad-
ministrative Remedies Available to the SEC for Breaches of Rule 1012-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 397, 410,
413 (1979) (discussing ancillary relief in SEC actions for breach of Rule 10b-5).
1 ' SEC v. American Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975.76 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 195,388, at 98,964 (D.D.C. 1975).
"6 See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972)
(disgorgement); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(receiver appointed), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1971); see generally Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in
SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1779 (1976) (examining the imposition of ancillary
relief in SEC enforcement actions) for cases cited therein.
"7 See Jacobs, supra note 134, at 412.
"B Id. at 401-02; see Note, supra note 94, at 336. This lesser burden may be due to the
statutory nature of SEC injunctions. One commentator has stated that "[slince SEC injunctions
are creatures of statute, all that must be established is what the statute requires, without reference
to proof of irreparable injury or the inadequacy of other remedies, as in the usual suit for injunc-
tion." Loss, supra note 66, at 1979.
19 See, e.g., American Dairy Queen Corp. v. Brown-Port Co., 621 F.2d 255, 257 (7th
Cir. 1980); Carlson Co. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1097 (D. Minn. 1974);
7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 65-39 to -45 (2d ed. 1974).
' 4° See id.
141 Id.
i42 Id.
143 id.
14
 See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975)
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tipping of the balance of hardships, t45
 nor is it required to show the inadequacy
of other remedies.'" Generally, the SEC must make a "proper showing" that
there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant is engaged in or is about to
engage in practices that violate the federal securities laws."'
In determining whether the SEC has met its burden of a "proper show-
ing," the court considers several factors prior to the issuance of an injunc-
tion.'" These may include: "the egregiousness of the [violations], the isolated
or recurrent nature of the infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the
sincerity of the [violator's] assurances against future violations, the [violator's]
recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and the likelihood that [his]
occupation will present opportunities for future violations." 149
 Some courts
also have considered the time elapsed between the violations and the court's
decision,' 5° whether the violator relied in good faith on advice of counsel,'"
and the adverse effect of an injunction upon the defendant. 152 The considera-
tion of these factors indicates that an injunction does not automatically issue
upon a finding of a past violation of the federal securities laws.' 53
The interests and comparison factors outlined above may now be weighed
in an Addington-type balancing test to determine the appropriate standard of
proof for SEC anti-fraud injunctions. On one side is the defendant's interest in
avoiding an injunction. This interest is comprised essentially of an inability to
commit future violations of the securities laws without risking civil or criminal
contempt charges if such violations occur."'" Also included is possible reputa-
tional damage from adverse publicity. 155
 In addition, such factors as the re-
(showing of irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law not required); SEC v. Parklane
Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (showing of irreparable harm not
required), aff'd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977); SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp.
1383, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (proof of irreparable injury not required); SEC v. J & B Indus.,
Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974) (requirement of proof of irreparable injury inap-
plicable). But see SEC v. Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497, 508 (F.D. Ky. 1975) (showing of ir-
reparable injury required), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Petersen 11975-76
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 95,254 at 98,319 (D. Minn. 1975) (showing of im-
minent threatened harm required). The SEC usually alleges irreparable injury to avoid the issue
of non-compliance with Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Loss, supra note 66,
at 1980.
14' See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 301, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
146 SEC v. Jet Travel Services, Inc. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED, SEC, L. REP.
(CCH) 195,317 at 98,608 (M.D. Fla. 1976).
"7 See supra note 66.
148 See Jacobs, supra note 134, at 403.
"9 SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 n.29 (5th Cir. 1978), quoted in Steadman v. SEC,
603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
' 5° See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 716 (D.D.C.
1978).
'" See SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
I" See SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972).
'" See, e.g., SEC v. Caternicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Monarch
Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979).
154 See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
• 155 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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quirement of a clear and convincing standard of proof for common law fraud
and the courts' determination that the SEC need not show all of the elements
required for a traditional injunction"' may suggest that the defendant's side of
the balance is important enough to warrant a shift in the allocation of the risk of
erroneous decision away from the defendant. On the opposite side of the
balancing test, weighed against these factors and the defendant's interest in
avoiding an injunction, is the public interest in protection against the perpetra-
tion of securities fraud.'" This interest has been recognized as very important
by both Congress and the courts.'" Indeed, Congress created the SEC to en-
force, by equitable means, the protection provided in the 1933 and 1934
Acts. 1 S 9 In cooperation with the congressional intent to protect the investing
public, the courts have traditionally held that the public interest takes prece-
dence over individual interests in SEC equitable actions."°
In providing only for such equitable enforcement actions as suits for in-
junctive relief, Congress appears to have followed the then-existing structure of
the equitable suit for misrepresentation or fraud with the lower burden of proof
required. 16 ' To require now an increase in the standard of proof for SEC in-
junctions would put such actions on the same evidentiary footing as civil fraud
cases for damages, a result Congress clearly did not intend.'" In addition to
carrying out the congressional intent favoring a low burden of proof for injunc-
tions against fraudulent practices in the securities industry, three other reasons
for maintaining such a low burden exist. First, the functions of private damage
suits and SEC injunctive actions are quite different. Private damage suits
usually seek to make an injured individual "whole'"" whereas SEC injunctive
actions seek to protect the investing public by preventing future violations of
the federal securities laws.'" This difference in function is additional support
for applying different standards of proof in civil fraud actions and SEC anti-
fraud injunctive actions.
Second, although the SEC need not show all of the traditional elements for
preliminary injunctions, the factors the courts consider prior to the issuance of
an injunction' 65 adequately protect the individual's interest. In situations
where the defendant has blatantly, repeatedly and egregiously violated the
federal securities laws, such factors will weigh heavily against the defendant. 166
See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
157 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
' 6° See cases cited supra note 126.
161 See Casenote, supra note 129, at 618-19; see also supra note 132.
162 See Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944) ("It is therefore even more compelling to
conclude that, if Congress desired to make such an abrupt departure from traditional equity
practice as is suggested, it would have made its desire plain").
165 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1 at 2, 2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971).
164 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963).
"5 See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
"6 See Note, supra note 94, at 343.
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So, also, in the case where the violation has been relatively minor and the ef-
fects of an injunction upbn the defendant are severe, the court may use its wide
discretionary authority in determining whether an injunction should issue.' 67
This power of discretion has not been exercised frivolously by the courts. 168 For
example, the SEC has frequently been denied injunctive relief upon a failure to
make a proper showing of a reasonable likelihood of future occurrences of
securities fraud. 16°
Finally, because the public's interest in protection is so significant, the low
preponderance standard of proof avoids needlessly hindering the SEC's ability
to police the securities industry."° These enforcement powers of the SEC were
deliberately designed by Congress to be broad and flexible enough to achieve
regulation of the very sensitive securities industry.' 7 k Courts, however, have
not allowed the SEC to operate in an unchecked fashion, despite a recognition
of the importance of the public interest in the effective enforcement of the
federal securities laws. Indeed, recent court decisions have increased the SEC's
burden in ways other than by increasing the standard of proof. For example, a
showing of scienter is now required to enjoin violations under certain anti-
fraud provisions. 12
 In addition, the availability of private actions under the
securities laws has been curtailed,'" thereby increasing the number of cases left
to SEC enforcement of the securities laws. To add further to the SEC's burden
by increasing the standard of proof could seriously endanger its ability to pro-
tect the public adequately. The resulting decrease in efficiency would thus frus-
trate the policies of investor protection and the encouragement of high business
ethics behind the enactment of the securities laws.' 74
In summary, the interests of the defendant in avoiding the imposition of
an injunction, although not insignificant, are outweighed by the paramount in-
terest of the public in protection against securities fraud. Moreover, the use of a
clear and convincing standard of proof is not warranted for securities injunctive
' 67 E.g., SEC v. Arco Industries [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
92,921 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); see Note, supra note 94, at 353.
'" See Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions — Standards for their Imposition, Modi-
fication and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 31, 38-39 (1980).
169 See, e.g., SEC v. Dimensional Entertainment Corp, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) i 97,578 at 98,054-55 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980); SEC v. Miller [1980
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 4197,551 at 97,890-91 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1980); see
cases cited supra at note 153.
' 7° See Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1139 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd an other grounds, 450
U.S. 91 (1981) (if burden is too high, policing ability of SEC is impaired).
11 See Note, supra note 94, at 335.
"2 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980).
173 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975)
(101)-5 protection only for purchasers or sellers of securities); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 472-75 (1977) (mere breach of fiduciary duty insufficient under 10b-5).
174 Increasing the standard of proof might also have the effect of discouraging the injunc-
tive action in federal court and encouraging resort to administrative proceedings. While this
would lessen the burden of cases in the district court, it might also lessen the availability of a com-
pletely impartial proceeding.
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actions despite the standard's employment in common law fraud cases. The
two actions are significantly different in their ultimate goals. Nor is the imposi-
tion of an increased standard of proof justified by the fact that the SEC need
not demonstrate all of the elements required for traditional equity injunctions.
Adequate procedural safeguards exist in the discretion of the court to consider
several factors prior to issuance of a securities injunction. Finally, an increased
burden of proof would have the effect of hampering the police function of the
SEC and thus lessening its ability to protect the public against securities fraud.
CONCLUSION
The court's holding in S.E.C. v. First Financial Group of Texas that the ap-
propriate standard of proof in SEC civil enforcement actions for injunctive
relief is a preponderance of the evidence standard should be extended to both
permanent and preliminary injunctions sought by the SEC for violations of the
anti-fraud provisions. Application of the Addington balancing of interests test
supports this conclusion. The defendant's interest in avoiding an inability to
commit future violations at the risk of a contempt charge and the risk of possi-
ble reputational damage is outweighed by the public's interest in protection
against future securities violations. Furthermore, because securities fraud is a
broader concept than common law fraud and the actions for common law fraud
and securities fraud differ significantly in their functions, the standard of clear
and convincing evidence applied in actions for common law fraud need not be
employed in securities fraud injunctive actions. In addition, adequate protec-
tion for the individual defendant's interest is available through the court's exer-
cise of its discretion in the consideration of several mitigating factors. There-
fore, the best allocation of the risk of erroneous decision is that of the
preponderance standard. Under this standard, the defendant and the SEC
share equally the risk and the chance of a favorable decision. An equal alloca-
tion preserves the SEC's ability to police the securities industry and permits it
to retain the flexibility of enforcement envisioned by Congress when it created
the SEC.
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